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I
n early 1962, the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) began to buy and sell
foreign currency. The decision to intervene in foreign exchange markets
was controversial and generated considerable internal debate. The debate
involved the fundamental issue of the Fed’s independence from the Treasury.
The Treasury has primary responsibility for ofﬁcial foreign exchange operations
in the United States. Hence, participation with the Treasury in foreign exchange
operations could jeopardize Fed independence. Moreover, the Federal Reserve
Act safeguards this independence by requiring that acquisition of Treasury debt
by the Fed be done in the open market, that is, at the Fed’s discretion rather
than at the behest of the Treasury. The practice of acquiring foreign exchange
directly from the Treasury in support of the Treasury’s operations could erode
that safeguard.
Former Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz (Shultz and Dam 1978,
p. 9) stated ﬂatly, “. . . the Fed takes direction from the President, through
the Treasury Department, on international monetary affairs.” Stephen Axilrod
(Burk 1992, p. 41), formerly Staff Director for Monetary and Financial Policy
at the Board of Governors, noted
. . . there is a deep distinction in the U.S. (unlike the U.K.) between interna-
tional and domestic monetary policy: the Fed is totally and utterly independent
when making a domestic monetary policy decision; not only is there no clear-
ance with the Treasury—to attempt it would cause a constitutional crisis.
The international arena is more complicated: here the Fed’s independence
is unknown and has not been fully tested, but in practice it is limited. The
Treasury controls international ﬁnance.
The opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
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The debate also dealt with whether the Federal Reserve Act authorized
the Fed to transact in foreign exchange. This article reviews the debate and
brieﬂy addresses subsequent developments. As background, the article begins
with a brief historical overview of the Bretton Woodssystem and the Treasury’s
Exchange Stabilization Fund.
1. BRETTON WOODS
In 1962, the United States was part of the Bretton Woods system. That in-
ternational monetary arrangement attempted to recreate key parts of the gold
standard, which had collapsed in the Depression. Member countries other than
the United States pegged their currencies to the dollar.The United States agreed
to maintain convertibility of the dollar to gold at the rate of $35 per ounce. As
required by the Federal Reserve Act, before 1968 Federal Reserve notes were
collateralized in part by gold.
If the United States ran a balance of payments deﬁcit and lost enough gold,
the Fed would have to contract the money stock. According to the classical view
of the gold standard, a reduction in the money stock would reduce the price
level and make U.S. goods cheaper to foreigners, who would increase their
purchases of U.S. goods. The resulting decline in the external deﬁcit would
end the gold outﬂow. Under the Bretton Woods system, as under the classical
gold standard, the price level was supposed to adjust to achieve balance in the
country’s external accounts.
By early 1959, the currencies of the countries in the European Eco-
nomic Community had become fully convertible into the dollar (for current
account transactions). (This review draws on Coombs [1976], Roosa [1967],
and Solomon [1982].) These countries, however, established exchange rates
that overvalued the dollar (made U.S. goods too expensive). Consequently, the
United States ran a signiﬁcant, persistent balance of payments deﬁcit. For-
eign central banks ﬁnanced part of the U.S. payments deﬁcit by accumulating
dollars, and foreign investors ﬁnanced part of it by willingly holding dollar
assets. However, between 1959 and 1961, the U.S. Treasury had to ﬁnance the
remainder of the deﬁcit through sales of gold to foreign central banks. Countries
relying on the United States for defense (Germany, Japan, and Italy) refrained
from gold purchases. Other countries (like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great
Britain) were fearful of being caught with a devalued dollar in their portfolios
and enforced the Bretton Woods discipline by asking the U.S. Treasury for
gold. By the end of 1960, U.S. gold losses had become front-page news in
papers like The New York Times.
In the early 1960s, monetary policymakers walked a tightrope requiring
them to balance internal and external objectives. The 1960 recession pushed
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spurred a capital outﬂow, widened the payments deﬁcit, and aggravated the
loss of the Treasury’s gold reserve. While in the middle of the 1960 presiden-
tial campaign, the country faced both a domestic recession and a balance of
payments deﬁcit, each requiring conﬂicting policy responses.
In 1954, Britain had reopened the London gold market. By 1960, it had
acquired a status comparable to the long-term bond market of today.Quotations
for the price of gold were a “barometer of conﬁdence in both the gold-dollar
parity and the Bretton Woodssystem generally” (Coombs 1976, p. 14). Through
most of the 1950s, sales of gold by South Africa and the Soviet Union had
kept the free market price at $35 per ounce. In 1960, however, the concern
arose in Europe that a Democrat might win the U.S. presidency and pursue
expansionary domestic policies.
On October 20, 1960, the London gold price suddenly shot up from close
to $35 an ounce to $40 an ounce. That created an arbitrage opportunity for
foreign central banks willing to sell gold in London and replace it by asking
the U.S. Treasury for gold. The Treasury decided to maintain the $35 price of
gold in the London market with gold sales. On October 31, 1960, candidate
John Kennedy promised that if elected he would maintain convertibility at the
$35 parity. Later as the President, in his February 6, 1961, message on the
balance of payments, he promised that the $35 price of gold was “immutable.”
The immediate crisis passed, but the drain of gold continued as Kennedy took
ofﬁce in January 1961, and the position of the dollar remained precarious.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Minutes in 1961 reveal a
persistent concern over the U.S. balance of payments deﬁcit, offset by a concern
for unemployment. For example, the Minutes (Board of Governors 1961, pp.
935–36) paraphrase one governor:
Mr. Mitchell noted that the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
had said recently that if unemployment did not decline, it would be up to the
Administration to create jobs. However, he (Mr. Mitchell) felt that it would
be better if the private economy could be persuaded to create jobs. Monetary
policy should do whatever it could to make this possible. . . . Foreigners
wanted to know how this country was going to get its payments position into
balance, but he did not feel that anyone in this country knew the answer to
this question. As he saw it, the Federal Reserve could do just one thing about
the balance-of-payments problem. It could encourage foreigners to leave their
money in this country by making interest rates competitive with those in key
European countries. In his opinion, however, carrying this policy much farther
than it had been carried in recent months would be too high a price to pay at
the moment, considering the importance of a somewhat lower level of interest
rates to stimulate the domestic economy.
In 1961, the FOMC raised interest rates twice out of a concern for the
external deﬁcit. At the October 24, 1961, meeting, the FOMC raised bill rates
from about 21/4 to 21/2 percent. New York Fed President Hayes, who as vice24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
chairman presided over the meeting in the absence of Chairman Martin, com-
mented (Board of Governors 1961, pp. 897–98)
That at least a goodly number of those around the table had expressed some
concern about the international problem and had recognized that there was
perhaps something the System could do to help, in a minor way, to show that
it was aware of the problem, without doing danger to the domestic economy.
Governor Mills expressed the general sentiment for an increase in rates at
the December 19 meeting (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1079):
Patently, time is of the essence in reorienting the existing monetary and credit
policy in the direction of moderate restraint. . . . What I consider as having
been an unpardonable delay in pursuing that objective has permitted distrust
in the exchange value of the U.S. dollar to grow and will consequently vitiate
counteroffensive interest rate efforts to stem the loss of gold from this country.
Reliance on collective central bank and International Monetary Fund actions
to protect the U.S. dollar should have been reserved for secondary emergency
application and not suggested for continuing use, in that public notice of resort
to these media will be regarded by cynical investors as acts of desperation and
not as curatives to temporary problems of international currency imbalances.
Initially, Chairman Martin urged postponement of a rise in rates, but he
then relented (Board of Governors 1961, pp. 1089–90 and 1136):
He questioned whether the situation had really come to the point where a
signiﬁcant change of policy was required. . . . He would hope that the System
would not get itself in the position, following the increase in the maximum
permissible interest rates on time and savings deposits, of being charged with
causing the commercial bank prime rate to be increased at this particular
juncture. [The Board of Governors had decided to raise the Reg Q ceiling on
deposits held for one year or more from 3 to 4 percent, effective January 1,
1962.]
Following additional discussion, Chairman Martin restated his conception
of the consensus of the meeting. As he saw it, the consensus was along the
lines of concentrating on a bill rate in the upper part of the range of 21/2 - 23/4
percent.
The external deﬁcit kept the FOMC from lowering market rates in July
1962 in response to weakness in economic activity. The bill rate, however, only
began to rise signiﬁcantly in June 1963 when it ﬁrst reached 3 percent.
With monetary policy basically immobilized because of weakness in the
domestic economy, the United States was left with only ad hoc measures to
deal with the balance of payments deﬁcit. In 1961, it reduced the duty-free al-
lowance on goods purchased abroad by American tourists from $500 to $100.
The United States moved to limit the demand for its gold stocks by making
it illegal for Americans to buy gold abroad. In 1962, it set up the London
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of gold. The U.S. government asked Germany to pay more of the expense of
maintaining U.S. troops in Germany.
The Treasury issued bonds denominated in foreign currencies, named
Roosa bonds after Treasury Under Secretary Robert Roosa, to obtain foreign
currency to purchase dollars. The Treasury and the Fed also began Operation
Twist, whereby the Fed began to hold longer-term securities, and the Treasury
began to issue mainly shorter-term securities. The resulting decrease in the sup-
ply of longer-term securities relative to shorter-term securities was supposed to
lower longer-term interest rates relative to shorter-term interest rates. The idea
was to encourage both domestic investment and short-term capital inﬂows. Al-
though the balance of payments exercised some inﬂuence on monetary policy,
the FOMC was unwilling to subordinate domestic to external considerations.
2. THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND
In 1961, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the U.S. Treasury began
to intervene in the foreign exchange markets. Its ability to intervene, however,
was limited by its resources. In 1934, Congress had created the ESF with the
Gold Reserve Act. Congress capitalized it with $2 billion of the proﬁts created
by that Act’s revaluation of gold from $20.67 to $35.00 per ounce. It put
the ESF under the control of the Treasury and authorized it to intervene in
the foreign exchange markets to stabilize the value of the dollar. In 1945, the
Bretton Woods Agreements Act transferred $1.8 billion of the ESF’s capital to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ESF, therefore, was left with $200
million in its capital account and no alternative funding sources apart from
money appropriated by Congress (see Todd [1991, 1992]). However, over the
years, the ESF had earned proﬁts through its purchases and sales of gold. It
invested these proﬁts in domestic and foreign securities. With the income from
those securities, by June 30, 1961, it had accumulated about $336 million in
assets. (Figures on the balance sheet of the ESF come from U.S. Treasury
Annual Reports.)
By 1962 the ESF had committed much of its resources through provision
of foreign aid, especially to Latin American countries. In 1960, it had acquired
Argentine pesos. In May 1961, the ESF agreed to exchange up to $70 million
dollars for Brazilian cruzeiros (U.S. Treasury 1961, p. 369). On January 1, 1962,
the ESF entered into an exchange agreement with Mexico for $75 million, and
in the middle of 1962 it entered into a swap agreement with the Philippines
(U.S. Treasury 1963, p. 57).1
1 At times, the ESF obtained the foreign exchange needed to purchase dollars in the for-
eign exchange market by borrowing from foreign central banks through an arrangement called a
“swap.” At other times, when the ESF needed dollars, in an arrangement called “warehousing,”
it would organize a trade with the foreign exchange in the Fed’s inventory in return for dollars.
The appendix explains the details of these two kinds of transactions.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Because so much of its resources were tied up, the ESF intervened mainly
in the forward markets. In that way, it would only need foreign exchange if it
had to close out a position at a loss. “Reference was made to the extent of op-
erations of the ESF in the forward market, as opposed to spot transactions, and
Mr. Coombs [manager of the New York Fed’s foreign exchange desk] said the
basic reason was that the ESF was short of money” (Board of Governors 1962,
p. 169). The dollar often traded at a large discount in the forward market. The
Treasury entered into commitments to furnish foreign currencies in the future
in order to reduce this discount. In doing so, it hoped to encourage individuals
to hold dollar-denominated assets by reassuring them that the dollar would not
depreciate in value.
In March 1961, the British pound weakened while the German mark and
Dutch guilder strengthened. Germany and the Netherlands revalued their cur-
rencies by 5 percent.2 Because many in the foreign exchange markets believed
that a 10 percent revaluation would be required to eliminate the German bal-
ance of payments surplus, capital continued to ﬂow into Germany. In forward
markets, the mark commanded a 4 percent premium.
German exporters . . . hedged by borrowing dollars . . . and converting these
dollars into deutsche marks immediately, counting on the future dollar receipts
to repay the dollar loans on maturity. Activities of this nature signiﬁcantly
increased the volume of dollars being offered on the exchange market, com-
pelling the German Bundesbank to acquire dollars in huge amounts. . . .
U.S. authorities were confronted with the possibility that the Germans would
have to purchase gold in order to prevent a further drop in their already low
gold/dollar ratio (U.S. Treasury 1962a, p. 3; Foreign 1962).
By the end of June, the ESF had entered into forward contracts agreeing
to deliver more than $250 million deutsche marks for dollars in the future.
Fortunately, the Treasury was able to unwind these positions without putting
pressure on the dollar in the summer because the Berlin Wall crisis produced
a weakening of the deutsche mark.
The Berlin crisis, however, produced capital ﬂight to Switzerland, and the
Swiss franc commanded a premium of 11/2 percent in the forward market. Start-
ing in July, the ESF began to sell Swiss francs forward to Swiss commercial
banks, which then became willing to hold the dollars instead of turning them
over to the Swiss National Bank. If the Swiss National Bank had been forced
to purchase the dollars, it would have been under pressure to use them to buy
gold from the Treasury. Toward the end of 1961, the Italian lira became the
strongest European currency, and the Italian central bank came under pressure
2 The following discussion draws on a memo (U.S. Treasury 1962a; Foreign 1962) that
“Secretary Dillon promised Chairman Martin we would furnish to the Board of Governors.”
The memo summarizes a letter from Robert Knight, Treasury General Counsel, to Ralph Young,
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to exchange the dollars it was accumulating for gold. In an attempt to encour-
age Italian commercial banks to hold dollars rather than turn them over to
the central bank, the ESF entered into $200 million in forward contracts. The
forward commitments of the ESF in lira and Swiss francs amounted to $346.6
million in early 1962.
Forward commitments, however, carried the risk of loss if the dollar did
not appreciate. Given the risk exposure due to the size of its forward commit-
ments, the Treasury felt that the ESF had insufﬁcient cash on hand. To provide
it with additional cash, the Treasury wanted the Fed to buy the ESF’s foreign
currencies such as the deutsche mark. The ESF could then acquire the lira and
Swiss francs it needed to meet its forward commitments without having to
incur the ire of other central banks by dumping their currencies on the market
in return for lira and Swiss francs.
A Treasury memo (Foreign 1962; U.S. Treasury 1962b, p. 2) noted
Total resources of the Fund at the present time amount to about $340 mil-
lion. Against these resources there are outstanding $222 million in Exchange
Stabilization agreements with Latin American countries, and some additional
agreements may be made from time to time. The free resources of the Sta-
bilization Fund are consequently quite small. . . . Spot holdings of foreign
exchange now amount to about $100 million . . . . These spot holdings must
in general be thought of as providing backing for outstanding forward ex-
change contracts (currently about $340 million equivalent). The entrance of
the Federal Reserve System into foreign exchange operations will therefore
provide particularly needed resources.
As Charles Coombs (1976, p. 71) put it later, “. . . the money-creating
authority, the Federal [Reserve] could rise to almost any ﬁnancial emergency,
whereas the Treasury was conﬁned, in the absence of new Congressional ap-
propriations, to the existing $330 million resources of its Stabilization Fund.”
3. LOOKING TO THE FED
On June 27, 1961, Ralph Young, Adviser to the Board of Governors, distributed
to FOMC members a memo proposing that the Fed become involved in the
coordinated foreign exchange intervention started by other central banks in
response to the March sterling crisis. When the pound sterling had weakened,
the Bank of England used its dollar reserves to buy pounds. The resulting
outﬂow of dollars ended up at other European central banks. Although those
banks recycled the dollars by lending them to the Bank of England, the U.S.
Treasury was concerned that the banks might use the dollars to buy gold from
the United States. To safeguard against such an event, Young recommended
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foreign exchange to buy dollars if necessary.3 He also recommended that the
Fed stand ready to replenish the ESF’s dollar holdings by purchasing its foreign
exchange through a procedure later termed “warehousing.”4
Young’s (1961, p. 8; Foreign 1961) memo stated
The assets of the Stabilization Fund cannot, without Congressional action,
be increased beyond the present amount of about $360 million. Part of this
amount is immobilized under present exchange agreements with Latin Amer-
ican countries. The rest is not sufﬁcient to cope with the swings in holdings
of foreign exchange . . . in periods of disturbed exchange market conditions.
Chairman Martin ﬁrst raised the issue of foreign exchange intervention at
an FOMC meeting on September 12, 1961. He let William Treiber, ﬁrst vice
president of the New York Fed, take the lead. Treiber (Board of Governors
1961, pp. 798–99) noted the weakness in the dollar and the ESF’s lack of
resources:
[The ESF’s] present size is about $1/3 billion, of which a large amount is
already tied up by stabilization agreements with certain Latin American coun-
tries. The scope of acquisition of hard currencies by the Fund is probably not
much over $100 million. While the Treasury may eventually ask the Congress
to authorize an increase in the resources of the Fund, I understand that in
any case the Treasury would welcome Federal Reserve acquisition of foreign
exchange as a helpful supplement. . . . Abrupt declines of the dollar to the
ﬂoor of the foreign exchanges have excited speculation as to possible changes
in currency parities . . . an adequate supply of the major foreign currencies
. . . [would] restrain a snowballing of speculative anticipations.
Young noted that the Treasury would like the Fed to become involved in
foreign exchange intervention so that it could use the ESF’s funds for other
purposes:
Mr. Young pointed out . . . that the Treasury has other jobs in connection with
the Stabilization Fund. That was one of the reasons why the funds available
for the particular kinds of operations under discussion were so limited. He
gathered that the Treasury might be happy if it were left free to use the
Stabilization Fund for the other things with which it had to deal (p. 815).
Carl Allen (Board of Governors 1961), president of the Chicago Fed, began
a discussion of the legality of Fed intervention in foreign exchange markets
3 As explained in Appendix A, in a swap the Fed or the ESF places dollar deposits with
a foreign central bank, which in return places deposits in its currency with the Fed. Appendix
A explains how the foreign exchange acquired through swaps was used to insure foreign central
banks against loss of value of their dollar holdings in the event of a devaluation of the dollar. In
this way, the United States persuaded foreign central banks not to purchase gold.
4 As explained in Appendix A, with warehousing the Fed credits the Treasury’s deposits
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and Karl Bopp, president of the Philadelphia Fed, raised the issue of whether
the Fed could retain its independence while working with the Treasury:
Just because a thing was legal, that did not mean that he [Allen] would always
want to do it. On the legality of the proposed operations, however, he did have
a question . . . whether it seemed clear that it would be legal for the System
to undertake such operations (p. 801).
. . . The Chairman then turned to Mr. Hackley [Board Counsel], who
commented that legal questions had, of course, been raised in the past. Nearly
30 years ago, as indicated in Mr. Young’s memorandum, the Board took a
position, which it did not publish, that would seem to preclude the implemen-
tation of the program such as suggested. However, for reasons that did not
need to be gone into today, he felt that the Board could well reinterpret the
law in a somewhat different manner, and in his view such a step would be
desirable. . . . Chairman Martin then stated that he had mentioned this subject
informally—not formally—to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Banking
and Currency Committees. . . . It would not be fair to say that the Committee
Chairmen had given any clearance of any kind (p. 802).
The Chairman went on to comment. . . . There was a very real point . . .
that the primary direction must come from the Treasury and that anything done
by the Federal Reserve must be coordinated with the Treasury. . . . Everyone
. . . ought to keep in mind what the framework was. Also, before entering
into any such operations, the System ought to do as the memorandum from
Mr. Young suggested; namely, take the matter up formally with the Chairmen
of the Banking and Currency Committees (p. 803).
Mr. Bopp said that as nearly as he could recall . . . one reason for its
[ESF’s] creation was dissatisfaction with the idea of the Federal Reserve han-
dling foreign exchange operations. . . . Through the Stabilization Fund . . . the
Treasury was to have the authority in case of any conﬂict. . . . In the longer
run, he noted, a possible conﬂict could develop between Treasury policy and
Federal Reserve policy in this area. This was a thing to keep in mind . . . the
sense in which the Treasury could direct Federal Reserve operations in this
ﬁeld even though Federal Reserve funds were used (p. 804). . . . Mr. Bopp
then commented that he was sympathetic to the approach suggested in Mr.
Young’s memorandum (p. 805).
Governor Robertson [Board Vice Chairman] was especially skeptical:
Mr. Robertson said . . . while he would not want to argue that the proposed
operations would be illegal, he thought that the point was highly questionable
(p. 805). . . . It seemed to him this whole problem was not fundamentally
the problem of the Federal Reserve, but rather of the Treasury. If so, Federal
Reserve operations of the kind suggested might be construed as bailing out
the Treasury. . . . Accordingly, before any operations were undertaken, he
felt that the Congress should have a chance to take a look, at least through
the Banking and Currency Committees, to see whether it was felt that the
Federal Reserve had the power to proceed. . . . In other countries there was
a much closer relationship between the central bank and the executive branch
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the dollar] did exist, he would not want to see the Federal Reserve take the
position that it could construe the statute [Section 14 of the Federal Reserve
Act] in any way it wished (p. 806).
FOMC members then raised a variety of questions:
Mr.Swan [president of the San Francisco Fed] noticed . . . that the Stabilization
Fund had certain amounts committed under existing stabilization agreements
with Latin American countries, whereas presumably Federal Reserve operation
would not involve such uses of funds (p. 808). . . . Mr.Wayne[president of the
Richmond Fed] said . . . he would feel much more comfortable if the Federal
Reserve had an ofﬁcial commitment from the Congress that operations of the
kind under consideration were clearly within its power (p. 809). . . . Mr. Allen
said . . . he had some doubt about the legality of Federal Reserve operations.
. . . He was inclined to think that the intent of Congress had been . . . to
have the Stabilization Fund do this job (p. 810).
4. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
The Federal Reserve Act does not explicitly authorize the Fed to inﬂuence
the value of the dollar by intervening in the foreign exchange market or to
acquire foreign exchange for that purpose by swapping deposits with foreign
central banks (establish swap lines). It also does not explicitly authorize the Fed
to acquire foreign exchange from the Treasury (warehousing). This omission
of powers undoubtedly reﬂected the adherence of the authors of the Federal
Reserve Act to the two dominant assumptions of their era: the discipline of
the gold standard and the real bills doctrine. Adherence to the gold standard
(continued in the Bretton Woods system) required that the Fed raise the dis-
count rate in response to gold outﬂows. It seems unlikely that the authors of
the Federal Reserve Act would have authorized actions designed to avoid this
discipline. Also, according to the real bills doctrine, a central bank should
extend credit only through discounting commercial bills (bills of exchange),
that is, on the basis of debt arising from the ﬁnancing of real productive ac-
tivity. Again, it seems unlikely that the authors of the Federal Reserve Act
would have authorized deposit creation for U.S. and foreign governments in
return for direct asset sales. (Foreign central banks were typically under direct
government control.)
Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act states “Any Federal reserve bank
may . . . purchase and sell in the open market, at home or abroad, either from or
to domestic or foreign banks, ﬁrms, corporations, or individuals, cable transfers
and bankers’ acceptances and bills of exchange.” Given the existence of the
gold standard and the acceptance of the real bills philosophy at the time of the
writing of the Federal Reserve Act, the simplest understanding of the power to
buy and sell foreign exchange (cable transfers in the language of the Federal
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in gold or bankers’ acceptances and bills of exchange. H. Parker Willis (1926,
p. 488), who drafted the Federal Reserve Act for Carter Glass, discussed the
intention of this part of the Federal Reserve Act. He wrote that the power to
deal in cable transfers facilitated the ability of Reserve Banks to purchase gold
abroad. These foreign gold purchases could be used to supplement the domestic
stockpiles of the Reserve Banks. Such purchases could also be used to avoid
unnecessary trans-Atlantic movements of gold. For example, a Reserve Bank
could use its holdings of gold in London to meet the needs of an individual
in London wanting to exchange dollars for gold and thus avoid the need for
shipment of gold from New York.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had opened swap lines in the
1920s with foreign central banks desiring to make their currencies convertible.5
In 1932, however, Carter Glass, senator from Virginiaand author of the Federal
Reserve Act, denounced on the Senate ﬂoor those swap lines as inconsistent
with the Federal Reserve Act. As a consequence, in the Banking Act of 1933,
Congress added language to the Federal Reserve Act giving the Board of Gov-
ernors the power to prevent the New York Fed from dealing directly with
foreign banks. “. . . the Board subsequently (in 1933 and 1934) construed
section 14(e) as limiting foreign accounts to the purchase of bills of exchange”
(U.S. Congress 1962, p. 147).
5. DEBATING FED FOREIGN EXCHANGE
INTERVENTION
At the request of Chairman Martin, Board Counsel Howard Hackley wrote a
memorandum outlining a legal basis for Fed participation in foreign exchange
operations. The FOMC discussed the memo at its December 5, 1961, meet-
ing. (The full memorandum is reprinted in U.S. Congress [1962]. Appendix B
summarizes the legal arguments of the memorandum.)
President Swan had already expressed his doubts in a November 30, 1961,
letter to Ralph Young (Foreign 1961). He argued that the memo was a “shaky
foundation for proceeding with a full-blown operation” because “the real bills
doctrine of the 1914 law” made it doubtful that the Federal Reserve Act would
authorize opening foreign accounts for purposes other than buying bills of
exchange. Most FOMC members shared the sentiments expressed by George
Clay (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1035), president of the Kansas City Fed:
5 Coombs (1976, p. 75) said of the swap arrangements he was discussing with other central
banks in January 1962, “Such swaps of one currency for another, with a forward contract to
reverse the transaction, say 90 days hence, had long been a standard trading instrument in the
foreign exchange markets. Moreover, back in 1925, the New York Federal [Reserve Bank] under
Governor Strong had arranged with the Bank of England a similar swap arrangement of $200
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Mr. Clay went on to say that he had a basic feeling against Government
agencies taking unto themselves authorities that had never been speciﬁcally
granted. . . . He felt that Congress should be given an opportunity, and in
fact urged, to assign this authority to the agency that in its wisdom it would
choose.
Governor King (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1043) commented:
He did not think the Federal Reserve was the proper place for these operations
if they were to be conducted. Instead, he felt that a political agency or body
would be the proper place to lodge the responsibility. As he had heard it said
on various occasions, if the System should get into politics at any stage it
could founder.
President Bopp (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1046) stated:
Like others who had spoken, he was concerned about the legal basis for
System operations in foreign currencies. The legal authority was not based on
speciﬁc provisions of the law but rather on a construction of the statutes. . . .
In a democratic process it was important . . . to have speciﬁc authorization.
President Bryan (Board of Governors 1961, pp. 1048–49) of the Atlanta Fed
urged the FOMC to concentrate on maintaining convertibility through the ap-
propriate domestic policies. “Sometimes . . . a great deal more harm can be
done, with good intentions, by intervening to save the patient some pain than
by letting him realize he is sick.”
Governor Robertson (Board of Governors 1961, pp. 1037–42) argued that
sterilized foreign exchange intervention by the Fed was bad law, bad politics,
and bad economics:
It does not follow that the power to maintain foreign accounts—basically an
incidental power—can be regarded as an authorization to exercise the broad
policy functions contemplated by the instant proposal. In other words, even if
foreign accounts may be maintained in connection with functions other than
dealing in bills of exchange, these must be functions that are authorized by
the Federal Reserve Act. Nowhere in the Act can authority be found for the
stabilization function that is the core of this proposal (italics in original).
Even if its legality were to be assumed, I think the proposed action would
be highly questionable because it is inconsistent with explicit Congressional
authority. . . . Purchasing foreign exchange from the Stabilization Fund when-
ever that fund has been used up or by operating in the same ﬁeld on its own
. . . could be interpreted as circumventing the will of Congress by making
available more dollars for the purpose of “stabilizing the exchange value of
the dollar” than Congress contemplated. . . . Such a function [selling foreign
exchange] . . . involves very sensitive international diplomatic relationships,
with which the Federal Reserve is not in the best position to cope. The function
would seem to be more appropriately one for the Treasury (which Congress
has already designated to handle the problem).
Federal Reserve operations in foreign currencies . . . would merely cam-
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problem. . . . If the amount of that fund [the ESF] is insufﬁcient, then the
Treasury should request Congress to expand the fund. . . . There are no gim-
micks by which the position of the dollar can be maintained in the world. It
would be unwise to resort to devices designed to hide the real problems and
assuage their symptomatic effects. . . . The United States must practice what
it has long preached about the need for monetary and ﬁscal discipline.
6. THE DECISION TO INTERVENE
The main defenders of Fed involvement in the foreign exchange markets were
Governor Balderston, Charles Coombs, and President Hayes of the New York
Fed. Balderston (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1058) argued that the Fed should
intervene in the foreign exchange market because “it was so close to the func-
tion carried on by the Open Market Committee in domestic affairs.” Coombs
(Board of Governors 1961, p. 1052) argued that “speculative pressures could
boil up within a matter of minutes in the exchange market. . . . It would be
desirable to have the resources to deal with such periodic emergencies, so that
exchange operations could resist speculative trends before they had gone too
far.” Hayes (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1054) argued that, since the ESF
was not in a position to intervene in foreign exchange markets, the Fed should
do so.
As to the roles of the Treasury and Federal Reserve, some of those who com-
mented had suggested that the Stabilization Fund was set up for this kind of
purpose. Actually,however, the Fund had been used for a lot of other purposes.
It had been used to assist United States foreign policy in relation to various
weaker currencies that needed shoring up, as a kind of State Department
activity.
In a poll conducted by Chairman Martin, thirteen of the eighteen FOMC
participants registered the opinion that “legislation is desirable” before be-
ginning to intervene in the foreign exchange market. (The poll is recorded
in the notes of Richmond’s President Wayne and are in the Richmond Fed
archives for the December 5, 1961, FOMC meeting.) One of the ﬁve in favor
of intervention, Governor Mills, expressed reservations. “He had no great faith
that operations of this kind could be conducted successfully or without serious
danger to the independent status of the Federal Reserve System.” Another of the
ﬁve in favor, Delos Johns, president of the St. Louis Fed, believed the FOMC
should seek enabling congressional legislation at the same time it proceeded.
Chairman Martin ended the meeting by saying that he would explore the matter
of legislation with the Treasury and report back to the Committee at its next
meeting.
At the December 19, 1961, FOMC meeting, Chairman Martin, supported
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relationship with the Treasury for foreign exchange intervention.6 Most mem-
bers agreed that Chairman Martin should continue discussions with the Trea-
sury, but agreed with President Deming of the Minneapolis Fed “that he would
regard operations in foreign currencies as a proper activity for the central bank
if statutory clariﬁcation could be obtained” (Board of Governors 1962, p. 1151).
At the January 9, 1962, FOMC meeting, Chairman Martin asked Hackley
to report to the FOMC on his discussions with the Treasury’s general coun-
sel, Robert Knight. Hackley noted that the Treasury’s general counsel and the
Attorney General concurred with his opinion. He also noted that the Treasury
opposed seeking legislation for three reasons (Board of Governors 1962, p. 61):
The international situation was very tender. . . . If there were discussions
on the Hill, they might be agitating to the markets. Second . . . it might be
better to seek such legislation after the Open Market Committee had some
experience in order to determine what its problems and limitations were.
. . . Third, there was a range of ideas on the Hill with regard to the Fed-
eral Reserve System. . . . Legislation, if sought, might become a vehicle for
adding various amendments the nature of which could not be foretold.
Chairman Martin said that he had conferred with the Secretary of the
Treasury, and they agreed that “regarding the question of seeking legislation
. . . there were real problems involved.” Martin suggested that he confer with
the chairmen of the House and Senate Banking Committees. “If the Committee
Chairmen . . . should feel strongly that the introduction of legislation would
cause a great deal of stir, it might be better not to embark on that course”
(Board of Governors 1962, p. 63). Governor King then commented
The Federal Reserve was being asked to go a little too far in the name of
cooperation. As he understood it, the Treasury was suggesting that it might
not favor legislation because of apprehension as to the outcome (p. 63).
The Committee then authorized Chairman Martin to confer with the chairmen
of the congressional banking committees.
At the January 23, 1962, meeting Chairman Martin reported to the FOMC
“on the general problem of obtaining legislation that would clarify the Commit-
tee’s authority to conduct foreign currency operations.” Although the Minutes
do not explain why, Chairman Martin no longer considered legislation an op-
tion. The Minutes note then that the FOMC had a roundtable discussion. They
record a reference to the opinions of the Committee’s and Treasury’s general
6 On December 18 the Secretary of the Treasury had sent a letter to Chairman Martin asking
for prompt resolution of the issue of FOMC involvement in foreign exchange intervention and
offering the advice of the Treasury’s legal staff. “I realize that the Committee might be hesitant
to embark on operations in which it has not engaged since the establishment of the Stabilization
Fund under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. If the Committee should be interested in the opinion
of the Treasury’s General Counsel . . . the Treasury’s legal staff will be ready to cooperate with
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counsels that the “System’s existing statutory authority, although in some re-
spects limiting, did provide a general sanction for Committee operations,” but
otherwise state only that “differing viewpoints were expressed.” The Minutes
(Board of Governors 1962, pp. 111–12) then state
In bringing the discussion to a head, it was moved by Mr. Balderston and
seconded by Mr. Hayes that the Committee go on record at this session as
favoring in principle the Committee’s initiation on an experimental basis of
a program of foreign currency operations; that Mr. Young, the Committee’s
Secretary, and Mr. Coombs, Vice President in charge of foreign operations
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, be authorized to explore for the
Committee with the Treasury the needed guidelines for actual operations . . .
and further that Chairman Martin be authorized to refer to this development in
his statement and testimony before the Joint Economic Committee scheduled
for January 30, 1962.
Ten of the twelve voting FOMC members voted in favor and two (Governors
Robertson and Mitchell) dissented.
At its February 13, 1962, meeting, the FOMC discussed the issue of “the
needed guidelines for actual operation.” The exchange was charged because it
dealt with the issue of Fed independence. Because foreign exchange interven-
tion involved U.S. relations with foreign governments, many FOMC members
were afraid that the Fed would inevitably become a junior member to the
Treasury. Earlier, in a November 30, 1961, letter to Ralph Young, President
Fulton of the Cleveland Fed (Foreign 1961) had written
There is a danger that if the System takes on the functions of the executive,
it will end up as a captive of the executive branch of the government. . . . It
might be safer for the Congress to designate the Treasury Department as the
principal locus of responsibility for exchange operations. . . . This approach
. . . would not rely on a tenuous Treasury-Federal Reserve “accord,” which
might not endure with different personalities and under different conditions.
For another thing, Congress would retain its traditional control over the purse
strings.
At the February 13 meeting, Governor King argued for explicit assurance
that the Fed could refuse to ﬁnance the activities of the ESF (Board of Gover-
nors 1962, pp. 175–77):
Mr. King raised a question with respect to the comment made earlier by Mr.
Young that there would be no speciﬁc rules at the outset on relationships
between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, the thought being that these
might evolve out of experience. He asked whether it might not be better to
have such rules.
In response, Mr. Young expressed the view that no general rule was
needed. . . . He did not think that the Treasury would be apt to come to the
System with the idea of selling from the Stabilization Fund unless something
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operations that would make it seem desirable, from the Treasury’s standpoint,
to get unloaded. There could always be that development. For example, an
underdeveloped country might need temporary help and there would be no
way to arrange it except to give a commitment from the Stabilization Fund.
In that event, the Treasury might need to convert some of its resources.
Mr.Robertson inquired as to the advantages seen—aside from the Federal
Reserve’s “unlimited pocketbook”—in having two agencies operating in this
ﬁeld instead of one, and Mr. Coombs replied that he did not think there were
any. . . . He [President Swan] asked whether it was not possible that the
Federal Reserve would just be in the role of supplying funds to the Treasury
rather than conducting foreign currency operations.
[Chairman Martin] considered it difﬁcult to sit down and attempt to draw
up such principles while the Federal Reserve was in the process of learning.
Chairman Martin then advanced a proposal that the Board of Governors, not
the full FOMC, have responsibility for foreign exchange intervention. Hackley
explained the proposal, which he had advanced in a memo dated February
8, 1962: “He [Hackley] did feel that in at least some respects this approach
might be more defensible from a legal standpoint” (Board of Governors 1962,
p. 177). The New York Fed and many other regional banks, however, objected
to being excluded. Most FOMC members felt that exclusion of the regional
banks would weaken the federal character of the System:
[Governor] Shepardson said that . . . either approach involved an interpretation
of the law that was rather nebulous. . . . On the assumption that the original
proposal would be legally supportable . . . participation of the entire Open
Market Committee would be desirable from the standpoint of System unity
(Board of Governors 1962, p. 186).
As part of this discussion, Chairman Martin recommended that decisions
about foreign exchange intervention be made by a subcommittee consisting of
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the FOMC and the Vice Chairman of the
Board of Governors. Earlier, Delos Johns (Board of Governors 1961, p. 1051),
president of the St. Louis Fed, had opposed such a delegation of authority:
He had real doubt about the power of the Committee to delegate its respon-
sibilities. That was an old question. . . . He was not quite satisﬁed by the
argument that a subcommittee that supervised the operations was not making
policy. The executive committee was abolished because the Committee be-
came convinced that it was not conﬁning its activities to administration and
instead was actually making policy. This is almost inevitably the result, he
suggested, when delegations of authority are made to a small group.7
7 Prior to 1955, only the Executive Committee (consisting of the Fed chairman, two
governors, the president of the New York Fed, and one other regional Bank president) met
regularly to make monetary policy. The full FOMC met only four times a year, with two of
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There was, however, no real opposition to delegating to a small subcommittee
authority over operations in the foreign exchange markets. Any other arrange-
ment appeared impractical.
Chairman Martin then asked for approval of guidelines for initiating for-
eign currency purchases. Although the Board staff had circulated on December
12, 1961 (Foreign 1961), a draft of congressional legislation that would give
the Federal Reserve explicit authority to transact in foreign exchange, Martin
(Board of Governors 1962, p. 193) argued
There were those . . . who felt that the law was not sufﬁciently clear. It might
be desirable to seek legislation in this area at some time, but at the moment he
doubted whether it would be feasible, with so little experience, to determine
what kind of legislation was needed. . . . The availability of those decisions
[Hackley’s memorandum and the opinions of the Treasury’s general counsel
and the Attorney General], along with a lack of System experience in foreign
currency operations, would handicap the System if it tried to get legislation.
The System would be asked what kind of additional legislation it needed, and
the Congress probably would not want to put itself in the position of approving
something if the Federal Reserve was not clear about its wishes in the matter.
In the words of Coombs (1976, p. 72), the FOMC then “somewhat appre-
hensively approved on February 13, 1962, the undertaking of market operations
in foreign currencies.”
At the March 6, 1962, FOMC meeting, discussion again centered around
the issue of whether the Fed, by participating in foreign exchange operations,
would be taking orders from the Treasury. The Treasury had two immediate
problems. First, a number of foreign governments, especially France, wanted
gold for their dollars. The problem was acute:
Mr. Coombs reiterated that a number of European central banks holding large
amounts of dollars had been deliberately refraining from taking gold. If any
bank should come in for a large amount of gold, an “every man for himself”
proposition could possibly develop (Board of Governors 1962, p. 273).
On February 28, in a telephone poll, the FOMC had approved entering into a
swap arrangement with France.8 Among the seven governors, King and Robert-
son had dissented and Mitchell had abstained.
The Treasury’ssecond problem was that the ESF needed dollars so it could
buy Swiss francs to meet its forward commitments:
Mr. Mitchell inquired of Mr. Coombs whether a purchase by the System of
marks from the Stabilization Fund might not be the kind of operation that
would leave the System open to the charge of bailing out the Stabilization
Fund. . . . At times . . . the Federal Reserve had been dominated by the
8 See the discussion in the appendix in the memo of Ralph Young, dated October 17, 1963,
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Treasury,so there was always a problem of maintaining a kind of arms-length
relationship. On the present occasion, the objectives of the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve tended to coincide, but a different situation could possibly
develop (Board of Governors 1962, pp. 277 and 280).
Reference was made by Mr. Thomas [Board economist] to the fact that
the Federal Reserve could not purchase U.S. government securities directly
from the Treasury. . . . Mr. Hackley [said] that the law clearly indicates that
direct purchases of U.S. government securities from the Treasury are not open
market transactions. As to foreign currency operations, he had come to the
conclusion, however, that in this sense the Stabilization Fund was a part of
the open market (Board of Governors 1962, pp. 279 and 283).
After Coombs noted that “the Stabilization Fund was strained to the utmost at
this moment” (Board of Governors 1962, p. 285), the Committee voted to buy
marks from the ESF.
7. CONGRESSIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT
On February 27 and 28, 1962, the House Committee on Banking and Currency
held hearings on legislation (U.S. Congress 1962) to increase the resources of
the IMF.Chairman Martin (U.S. Congress 1962, pp. 91–92) used these hearings
to announce that the Federal Reserve had become involved in foreign exchange
intervention:
The Federal Reserve has recently acquired small amounts of several convert-
ible currencies widely used in international transactions from the Treasury
Stabilization Fund and has opened accounts with several European reserve
banks. . . . While in time it may be desirable to recommend amendment of the
Federal Reserve Act to provide greater ﬂexibility than we now have under the
act in carrying out these operations, it would be impractical to request such
legislation before operating experience under existing authority has provided
a clear guide as to the need for it.
Rep. Reuss (U.S. Congress 1962, pp. 102 and 140) criticized the use of
the “nearly unlimited money creative powers of the system” to intervene in the
foreign exchange markets:
Much of the operation that you are doing . . . seems to me to duplicate the
foreign exchange stabilization operation that the Secretary of the Treasury has
very properly undertaken pursuant to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934. To me
this is a tremendous power you have taken upon yourself, and I must serve
notice on you right now that I consider this an usurpation of the powers of
Congress. . . . You come in here and tell us that you propose to go off on, if
I may say so, a frolic of your own, involving unspeciﬁed sums without the
slightest statutory guidance.
Chairman Martin (U.S. Congress 1962, p. 140) challenged Rep. Reuss’
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Federal Reserve Board as to our existing authority on this, Mr. Reuss. But as I
reiterate, our lawyers said we had the authority,the Treasury counsel concurred,
and the Attorney General concurred with them.” Copies of the Hackley Mem-
orandum, the opinion of the Treasury’s general counsel and the concurrence
of the Attorney General were provided to the Committee at its request and
published in the hearing record.9
8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
From the time of the ﬁrst swap arrangement with France for $50 million in
1962 to the closing of the gold window in August 1971, Fed swap lines grew
to $11.7 billion. The entrance of the Fed into the foreign exchange markets ini-
tially produced considerable internal debate. On the one hand, Coombs (1962, p.
469) considered foreign exchange intervention to be integral to maintaining the
international monetary order. “[W]hen the exchange markets become seriously
unsettled by political or other economic uncertainties, normally beneﬁcial spec-
ulation may quickly become transformed into a perverse, and sometimes even
sinister, force.” On the other hand, Governor Robertson (Board of Governors
1962, p. 185) was critical:
9 The Fed’s conduct of foreign exchange operations has continued to be the subject of much
discussion in the years since the internal FOMC debate chronicled in this article. In commenting
on an earlier draft of this article, members of the Board of Governors’ staff suggested that the
following additional information be included for completeness:
Since 1962, Congress has reviewed the foreign currency operations of the Federal Reserve
in hearings on related issues. The Hackley Memorandum was published a second time in a 1973
hearing record of the House Banking Committee on the Par Value Modiﬁcation Act of 1972.
In addition, the Annual Reports of the Board have described and provided data on the Federal
Reserve’s foreign currency operations, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has submitted
quarterly reports to Congress on Treasury and Federal Reserve foreign currency operations. Al-
though Congress can properly be considered to have been fully aware of these published materials,
it has not acted to restrict the authority of the Federal Reserve to engage in these operations.
In fact, Congress has recognized and facilitated the Federal Reserve’s foreign currency op-
erations by amending a related provision of the Federal Reserve Act to permit the investment of
foreign exchange obtained through those operations. In 1980, Congress amended Section 14(b)(1)
of the Act to grant Reserve Banks the authority to invest foreign exchange in “short-term foreign
government securities.” The provision was enacted as part of the Monetary Control Act of 1980
in response to a long-standing request from the Board. Its enactment demonstrated congressional
awareness and suggested tacit acceptance of the Federal Reserve’s foreign currency operations.
Finally, in 1989 and 1990 the Federal Reserve conducted a comprehensive study and review
of System foreign exchange operations. This material was discussed and reviewed by the FOMC
at its meeting on March 27, 1990. All aspects of the operations, including the policy and legal
basis of such operations, were thoroughly examined. After consideration of the material, the
FOMC voted in favor of increasing the limits on the System’s holding of foreign currencies and
on the amount of eligible foreign currencies the System was willing to warehouse for the Treasury
and the ESF. The discussion and the votes were reported in the published FOMC minutes. Three
members dissented from these decisions. Two of the dissenters cited concerns about the absence
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Mr. Robertson recalled that he had opposed the whole program of operations
in foreign currencies on legal, practical, and policy grounds because it had
seemed to him that the only basis for the entrance of the Federal Reserve
into this ﬁeld would be to supplement the resources of the Stabilization Fund
and because the program was being undertaken without speciﬁc congressional
approval.
The place of the Federal Reserve System within the U.S. government is
different from the place of central banks in other countries because the U.S.
government is different. The U.S. government is characterized by a division
of powers, with ﬁscal policy assigned to Congress. As discussed in Appendix
A and Broaddus and Goodfriend (1995), the sterilized foreign exchange inter-
vention and warehousing practiced by the Fed since the early 1960s constitute
ﬁscal policy, not monetary policy. That fact raises fundamental issues about
the Fed’s operations in the foreign exchange markets. Policymakers vigorously
debated many of these issues when the Fed ﬁrst became involved in the foreign
exchange markets in the early 1960s. Those debates remain helpful today in
assessing the proper role of the Federal Reserve System.
APPENDIX A: SWAPS AND WAREHOUSING
The Fed can obtain the foreign exchange it requires to buy dollars in the foreign
exchange market through a swap of currencies with another central bank. In a
swap, the Fed agrees to establish dollar deposits on its books for the German
Bundesbank in exchange for the Bundesbank establishing mark deposits for the
Fed. At the same time, the Fed agrees via a forward transaction to reexchange
the same amount of marks for the Bundesbank’s dollars at a given date in the
future. Before the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of ﬁxed exchange
rates, the United States used swaps to provide cover for the dollar holdings
of foreign central banks. That is, as a consequence of maintaining the ﬁxed
exchange rate with the dollar, the Bundesbank might have to buy dollars it did
not want to hold. It would have liked to exchange them for gold at the U.S.
Treasury, but the Treasury did not want to deplete its stockpile of gold.
The U.S. Treasury could persuade the Bundesbank to hold the unwanted
dollars by guaranteeing the Bundesbank against loss in case of a devaluation of
the dollar. The Treasury did so by having the Fed take marks acquired by the
latter in a swap transaction and use them to buy dollars from the Bundesbank.
Counting the dollars in its swap account, the Bundesbank ended up with the
same amount of dollars as before the swap, but more of the dollars it did
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decided not to renew the swap agreement, it could just exchange at the old
exchange rate its dollars at the Fed for the marks in the Fed’s deposit at the
Bundesbank. The Fed, however, since it had used its marks to buy the Bundes-
bank’s dollars, would have to go into the market to buy the marks. (In practice,
the Treasury always protected the Fed from loss in buying the necessary foreign
exchange.)
Ralph Young (1963; Swap), Director of the Board’s Division of Interna-
tional Finance, provided the following explanation:
Foreign monetary authorities were increasingly unwilling to hold additional
dollar claims on an uncovered basis. . . . When the System draws foreign
currencies for temporary use under a swap arrangement, the foreign central
bank comes into additional dollar holdings that are covered against exchange
risk in an amount corresponding to the System’s drawing. As the System uses
the currencies that it has drawn . . . through a direct sale against dollars with
the foreign monetary authority, the uncovered dollar holdings of the foreign
monetary authority are reduced . . . by a corresponding amount. In this way,
although the foreign central bank in question ends up holding the same amount
of total liquid dollar assets that it would have held in the absence of the swap
drawing . . . its uncovered dollar holdings can be held down to the amount
that . . . it is content to hold. And in this way, gold sales by the U.S. Treasury
are avoided (italics in original).
After the breakdown of the ﬁxed parities of the Bretton Woods system in
the early 1970s, the Fed began using the foreign exchange acquired in swap
transactions to intervene directly in the foreign exchange markets in response to
weakness in the external value of the dollar. At that time, swaps assumed their
more modern function of attempting to inﬂuence market psychology. Charles
Coombs (Board of Governors 1971), Manager of the System foreign exchange
account, and Fed Chairman Arthur Burns (Board of Governors 1972), respec-
tively, expressed the change:
Mr. Coombs remarked that the rationale of the swap network rested on two
main considerations. First, the network enabled the System to shield the Trea-
sury gold stock and other reserve assets by providing the alternative of an
exchange guarantee to foreign central banks having dollars they wished to
convert. . . . That part of the rationale had now fallen away, since the decision
of August 15 [1971, closing the gold window] had made the dollar inconvert-
ible into gold or other reserve assets (p. 1101). . . . More generally, the swap
network had come to be regarded in the market as the very symbol of central
bank cooperation (p. 1102).
By demonstrating that the United States was prepared to cooperate with
other nations . . . such operations [in the foreign exchange markets] could
have a major impact on market psychology (pp. 734–35).
Swaps constitute a ﬁscal policy, not a monetary policy, action. (See Good-
friend and King [1988] on monetary and ﬁscal policy.) Consider a swap line
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for dollar deposits at the Mexican central bank. If the Mexican central bank
tries to prop up the value of its currency by using its dollar deposits to buy
pesos on the foreign exchanges, the U.S. monetary base increases. The Fed will
sterilize this increase in the base by selling U.S. Treasury securities out of its
portfolio. As a result, the Fed’s portfolio will come to include fewer U.S. assets
and more peso assets. Because the monetary base ends up unchanged, the Fed
has not undertaken a monetary policy action. Neither the U.S. money stock
nor interest rates changes. However, when the Fed sells Treasury securities,
the supply of U.S. Treasury securities in the hands of the public increases. The
effect is the same as though the Treasury had lent money to Mexico by selling
Treasury securities to the general public. The Fed has undertaken a ﬁscal policy
action.
Warehousing is one way the Treasury obtains funds for either intervening
in the foreign exchange market or lending to a foreign government. It also
involves a ﬁscal policy action by the Fed (Goodfriend 1994). With warehous-
ing, the Fed puts dollars into a deposit account of the U.S. Treasury in return
for assets denominated in foreign currencies from the Treasury. At the same
time, the Fed and the Treasury agree to reverse the transaction at a future date.
Warehousing is equivalent to a repurchase agreement in which the Fed makes
a loan to the Treasury using the foreign assets as collateral. When the Treasury
uses the dollars it has gained to intervene in the foreign exchange market, the
Fed offsets the resulting increase in the monetary base by selling a Treasury
security. As above, government debt in the hands of the public increases. It
is as if the Treasury issued debt to obtain dollars with which to buy foreign
exchange.
If the Fed provides a loan to Mexico via a swap or to the Treasury via
warehousing, the measured federal government deﬁcit does not rise because for
accounting purposes the Fed is assumed to be part of the private sector. What
is relevant for ﬁscal policy, however, is government debt in the hands of the
taxpaying public. If the Fed acquires an additional government security, it will
return the interest it receives to the Treasury. Interest paid on the debt is a wash.
In contrast, if the private sector acquires an additional government security, the
U.S. government must come up with additional funds to pay the interest. Swap
lines and warehousing that ﬁnance sterilized foreign exchange intervention are
ﬁscal policy actions because they increase the debt that taxpayers must fund.10
Because of the separation of powers at the federal level that characterizes
the U.S. framework of government, the involvement by the Fed in ﬁscal policy
raises a number of issues. The U.S. Constitution assigns the major decisions
10 The additional interest the Treasury owes because of the increase in its debt outstanding
can be offset by the interest gained on the acquisition of a foreign asset. The redistribution of
assets, however, is still ﬁscal policy. With warehousing or a swap, the Fed has extended credit to
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about ﬁscal policy to Congress. When the Fed undertakes a ﬁscal policy action,
it is off-budget; that is, it is not subject to the regular congressional budget
process. For further discussion, see Broaddus and Goodfriend (1995).
APPENDIX B: THE HACKLEY MEMORANDUM
The Hackley Memorandum outlining a legal basis for transactions by the Fed in
the foreign exchange market dealt with the three ways the Fed acquires foreign
exchange: (1) directly from the Treasury in return for crediting the dollar de-
posits of the Treasury at the Federal Reserve; (2) directly from foreign central
banks in exchange for dollar deposits placed with those banks; and (3) in the
open market in exchange for dollar deposits at private banks.
In his memo, Hackley pointed to the language of Section 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act, which lists transacting in foreign exchange (cable transfers) as an
express power.11 (“Any Federal reserve bank may . . . purchase and sell in the
open market, at home or abroad, either from or to domestic or foreign banks,
ﬁrms, corporations, or individuals, cable transfers and banker’s acceptances
and bills of exchange.”) He argued that not only does this language allow the
Fed to intervene in the foreign exchange market but also to acquire foreign
exchange directly from the Treasury. In taking this position, Hackley made
two assertions: “Within the meaning of . . . Section 14,” the United States
(the Treasury) is a “corporation” and Federal Reserve purchases of foreign
exchange “from the Stabilization Fund may reasonably be regarded as ‘open
market’ purchases.” He defended the ﬁrst assertion by reference to Chief Justice
Marshall’s deﬁnition of a “corporation” in the Dartmouth College case as “an
artiﬁcial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law”
(U.S. Congress 1962, p. 149).
He defended the second assertion by arguing that the Treasury is part of
“the open market” for purposes of transacting in foreign exchange, but not for
transacting in government debt because the Treasury does not issue the foreign
exchange, but it does issue debt (U.S. Congress 1962, p. 149):
By the Banking Act of 1935, Congress prohibited such purchases of Govern-
ment obligations except in the “open market.” . . . It seems clear, however, that
this limitation on direct purchases of Government obligations was intended to
prevent the Federal Reserve System from lending its resources to the Treasury
in a manner that might be inconsistent with the System’s monetary and credit
11 The discussion of Section 14 in the section of this article entitled “Background to the
Debate” dealt with intent or purpose. Hackley’s discussion deals exclusively with powers. The
purpose of granting someone a license to drive a car may be to allow him to drive to the store.
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responsibilities. These considerations, of course, are not applicable to pur-
chases of cable transfers from the Treasury. In other words, an “open market”
in cable transfers may be regarded as embracing any person with whom a
Reserve bank may feel free to deal, including the United States Treasury,
which is a part of that market; whereas an “open market” in Government
obligations may be regarded as excluding the United States Treasury, which
issues such obligations and consequently is not part of that market. . . . On
balance, it is my opinion that a Reserve bank’s purchases of cable transfers
from the Stabilization Fund may be regarded as “open market” purchases from
a “domestic corporation.”
In outlining a legal basis for swap transactions with foreign central banks,
Hackley (U.S. Congress 1962, p. 149) turned to paragraph (e) of Section 14,
“Foreign Correspondents and Agencies:”
Every Federal reserve bank shall have power . . . with the consent or upon
the order and direction of the Board of Governors . . . to open and maintain
accounts in foreign countries, appoint correspondents, and establish agencies
in such countries wheresoever it may be deemed best for the purpose of pur-
chasing, selling, and collecting bills of exchange . . . (or acceptances) arising
out of actual commercial transactions which have not more than ninety days
to run.
Interpretation of this language turns on the qualifying language “wheresoever
it may be deemed best.” An interpretation consistent with the real bills doctrine
is that this language allows the Fed only “to open and maintain accounts in
foreign countries . . . for the purpose of purchasing, selling, and collecting bills
of exchange.”
Hackley, however, argued that the wheresoever clause does not limit the
Fed’s authority to open accounts in foreign countries as a way of engaging in
swaps.12 In defending this position, Hackley (U.S. Congress 1962, p. 146) ﬁrst
argued that the language does not unambiguously limit the opening of accounts
just to dealing in bills of exchange:
. . . perhaps the strongest argument for the more liberal construction of the
statute may be based upon the ambiguous nature of the phrase “wheresoever
it may be deemed best.” . . . It does not expressly require such accounts . . .
to be utilized only for the purpose of buying and selling bills of exchange. It
is susceptible of the construction that such accounts may be opened wherever
geographically it may be reasonably contemplated that they might be used at
some time for such purpose but that they need not be limited to that purpose
(italics in original).
12 Hackley said later in commenting on the legality of swap arrangements with the Bank of
England, “There was no express authority in the [Federal Reserve] Act for the Federal Reserve
to extend credits to foreign banks, although such an action might be justiﬁed under the authority
for the Federal Reserve Banks to open accounts with foreign banks” (Board of Governors 1967,
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Hackley then notes that Section 14(e) concludes by stating that once “any
such account has been opened . . . by a Federal reserve bank . . . any other
Federal reserve bank may . . . carry on . . . any transaction authorized in this
section.” That is, foreign deposit accounts can be used for any purpose, not
just transacting in bills of exchange.
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